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Privatization Policy –  
Learning from Best Practice and Mimicking Policy Fashions?  
Empirical Evidence from the Telecommunication Sector 
ABSTRACT 
This working paper examines the question whether the privatization of network based 
utilities results from policy diffusion across the OECD world, and if so which diffusion 
mechanisms have been relevant. Therefore, a completely new panel data set on privati-
zation in the telecommunication sector is introduced which offers a unique opportunity 
for a broad-based international comparison. The sample includes 18 OECD countries 
between 1980 and 2007. In order to analyze the hypotheses empirically, spatial econo-
metric techniques are used. The paper shows that governments do not implement priva-
tization policies independently of each other. Second, the relevant spatial interdepend-
encies are determined by geographical proximity and economic relationships. Countries 
clearly tend to privatize when trading partners or countries that are geographically close 
to them do so. Third, there is no evidence that governments adopt policies of countries 
with similar cultural backgrounds or simply where privatization leads to the intended 
outcomes at the company level. Fourth, the diffusion of privatization policy is highly 
influenced by the openness of the economy. Open economies are more receptive to dif-
fusion mechanisms than economies that are only moderately involved in the interna-
tional market.   
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Privatization Policy –  
Learning from Best Practice and Mimicking Policy Fashions?  
Empirical Evidence from the Telecommunication Sector 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Liberal economic policies in general and privatization in particular have been spread 
around the globe in recent decades (Bortolotti et al. 2003). While in the beginning it was 
mainly the industrial sector that was affected by the selling off of public enterprises, 
governments have also applied divesture programs to public services such as energy, 
telecommunications, and rail infrastructure as well as postal and water services (Clifton 
et al. 2003). These network based utility sectors1 are known as natural monopolies and 
therefore are affected by market failure (Majone 1997, p. 144). With the emergence of 
neoliberal ideas, public enterprises were no longer seen as an effective instrument for 
responding to market failure.  In order to meet macroeconomic objectives, such as eco-
nomic growth or the reduction of public debt, the public enterprises were widely privat-
ized. (Bortolotti and Siniscalco 2004). Privatization in network based utility sectors of-
ten began with a restructuring process, transforming administrative bodies or public 
corporations into joint stock companies (i.e. formal privatization). Formal privatization  
has typically paved the way for the divestment of public shares (i.e. material privatiza-
tion).2  
To date, privatization is considered as “an established policy” in the OECD world 
(Meseguer 2009, p. 111). the existing  literature on explaining the timing and the extend 
of privatization are  primarily focused on domestic and external factors. Right wing par-
ties, a high level of public debt and an institutional arrangement with a low number of 
veto points are assumed to accelerate the privatization process. Furthermore, interna-
tional factors, such as globalization and Europeanization as well as technological pro-
gress are seen as fostering the retreat of the state (Boix 1997; Bortolotti and Siniscalco 
2004; Schneider and Häge 2008). However, the majority of the studies neglect possible 
spatial interdependencies among countries and assume that governments choose policy 
strategies independently of each other.  However, it is plausible that governments emu-
late the strategies adopted by neighboring countries, succumb to the peer pressure of 
their reference group or learn from best practice. In sum, privatization has “diffused 
rather than [being] reproduced independently as a discrete event in each country and 
sector” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 28). This paper therefore, examines the question whether the 
                                                 
1  The terms “network based utilities” and “public utilities” are used interchangeably in this paper.  
2  The concept of “formal” and “material privatisation” is described in further detail in section 3. 
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privatization of network based utilities results from policy diffusion across the OECD 
world, and if so which diffusion mechanisms have been relevant. 
I focus on the privatization in the telecommunication sector for several reasons. First, 
diffusion processes seem most likely to occur in sectors that operate across borders and 
are not restricted by national boundaries. Second, the telecommunication sector is 
highly relevant in economic terms.  It contributes up to 4 % to  the national GDP and 
the telecommunication providers are also typically among the largest national employ-
ers. Third, the privatization process of telecommunication services has been advanced to 
a remarkable extent and therefore provides enough variance for a meaningful analysis of 
diffusion processes. The sample includes 18 OECD countries between 1980 and 2007. 
This paper focuses on this period because, comprehensive privatization programs 
started in the 1980s.  In order to analyze the hypotheses empirically,  spatial economet-
ric techniques will be used (Beck et al. 2006).  
The paper contributes to the research literature in the following ways. First, a new 
indicator is proposed which integrates the two relevant dimensions of privatization in 
the network based utility sectors: formal and material privatization. Secondly, a com-
pletely new panel data set on privatization in the telecommunication sector offers a 
unique opportunity for a broad-based international comparison. Third, spatial interde-
pendencies are explicitly analyzed which have hardly been considered to date. In order 
to deal with Galton’s problem, I pay special attention to a careful disentanglement of 
spatial dependence from other sources of spatial patterns, such as common trends and 
shocks or the spatial clustering of explanatory variables. Fourth, by analyzing several 
distinct diffusion mechanisms and the role of mediating factors for the importance of 
diffusion, a more comprehensive picture of spatial interdependencies can be drawn than 
it has hitherto been the case.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of the research 
literature. Section 3 presents the main concept and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 
outlines the measurement and the description of the dependent variable, the methodo-
logical design and the control variables. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical 
analyses and central findings and Section 6 concludes.  
2. EXPLAINING PRIVATIZATION: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
The first international comparative studies emphasized domestic and external factors as 
relevant concepts for the timing and the extent of privatization processes. For example, 
analyzing the determinants of privatization in one of the first international comparative 
studies, Boix (1997) finds for a sample of OECD countries that right wing parties are 
more inclined to engage in privatization than left wing parties. However, Zohlnhöfer 
and Obinger (2006) provide evidence that the influence of party differences was espe-
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cially relevant in the 1980s but  has been decreased over time. Furthermore, using a 
sample of 14 European and 21 OECD-countries, they found that institutional pluralism 
negatively affects privatization. Moreover, budget deficits are seen to put pressure on 
governments to divest shares (Belke et al. 2007).  two large samples of 34 and 49 coun-
tries, Bortolotti et al. (2003) state that slow economic growth, encourages the state’s 
retreat from telecommunication services and  the liquidity of stock markets and gov-
ernment credibility are associated with high privatization proceeds. Schneider and Häge 
(2008) emphasize that European integration has accelerated the reduction of public in-
volvement in the infrastructure sectors in the member states of the European Union. 
Brune et al. (2004) examine the relevance of the IMF for material privatization activities 
in  a sample of 96 countries which have received support from the IMF. Their results 
support the proposition that international institutions and economic problems trigger 
privatization.  
In recent years, scholars have begun to consider cross national interdependencies 
while analyzing privatization processes. For example, Meseguer (2004, 2009) shows 
that privatization efforts in Latin American countries are a result of rational learning 
from regional experiences rather than  the experiences made in OECD countries. In con-
trast, European countries, such as Spain and Portugal tend to learn from the Latin 
American experience when it comes to privatization. Using a sample of 92 countries, 
Kogut and MacPherson (2008) show that, the spread of American-trained economists in 
think tanks, fosters the diffusion of privatization. Levi-Faur (2003) analyzes privatiza-
tion as one part of the liberalization of the telecommunication and electricity sector in 
32 European and Latin American countries. By using descriptive statistics to detect evi-
dence of policy transfer, Levi-Faur finds that in Latin American countries policy trans-
fer is “emulative, coercive and simple” (Levi-Faur 2003, p. 730), while European coun-
tries tend to learn from each other. 
This brief literature review reveals several drawbacks. First, the vast majority of the 
studies emphasize domestic and external factors as driving and structuring privatization 
and they assume that governments implement privatization policies independently from 
each other. The empirical analysis of interrelationships between countries or groups of 
countries is still in its infancy. Spatial patterns, if considered at all, are often seen as a 
nuisance and relegated to the error term. Second, the very few empirical studies focus-
ing on the diffusion of privatization generate ambivalent empirical findings.  They typi-
cally focus only on  one channel of diffusion (Kogut and MacPherson 2008; Levi-Faur 
2003; Meseguer 2009). Third, the studies analyzing diffusion mechanisms, implicitly 
assume that all countries are equally sensitive to diffusion processes and  the importance 
of spatial interdependencies does not depend on national characteristics. The relevance 
of conditioning factors for the diffusion of privatization policy has not been considered 
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yet. Forth, the quantitative literature on privatization focuses on privatization proceeds 
(Belke et al. 2007; Boix 1997; Bortolotti and Siniscalco 2004; Zohlnhöfer et al. 2008), 
on the percentage of shares held by the state (Schneider and Häge 2008) or on privatiza-
tion activities in the form of divestments of public shares (Kogut and MacPherson 2008; 
Meseguer 2004, 2009). These indicators only map the material dimension of the phe-
nomenon but do not take formal privatization into account. However, this dimension is 
of particular relevance with regard to public utilities.  
3. CONCEPTS AND HYPOTHESES 
Concept of Privatization 
As argued above, the privatization of network-based utilities is affected by formal and 
material privatization. Despite national differences, two types of formal privatization 
can be distinguished. The first type refers to the transformation of a departmental 
agency as a part of a ministry (e.g. the Direction Générale des Télécommunication in 
France) into a public corporation (e.g. France Télécom) which  is subject to special or 
public law. While a departmental agency does not have its own legal personality and is 
subordinated to a ministry, a public corporation is an autonomous public body with its 
own legal status and a partial commercial structure. Although a law or statute often de-
fines the objectives of a public corporation, it has more autonomy in day-to-day opera-
tions than a departmental agency (Boes 1986). The second type of formal privatization 
is the change of a public corporation into a state company subject to private law, such as 
a joint stock company (e.g. British Telecom plc). A state company is subjected to the 
same rules as private companies. In contrast to public corporations or departmental 
agencies, state companies are only responsible for the well-being of the enterprise itself. 
The state remains the unique stakeholder (Boes 1986).3 Before the public enterprises are 
formally privatized, it is not possible to sell shares and therefore to start material priva-
tization. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptualization of formal and material privatization.  
Figure 1: Conceptualization of Privatization 
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3  A departmental agency can also be directly transformed into a state company subject to private law. 
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Hypotheses 
The basic assumption of spatial interdependencies is that political actors do not imple-
ment policies independently of each other since their policy choice is influenced by the 
choices that others make (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Franzese and Hays 2007). These 
interdependencies among countries may lead to the diffusion of policy strategies. Diffu-
sion denotes a process by which the adoption of a certain policy in one or more coun-
tries leads to policy changes in other countries (Strang 1991, p.4).  
What drives the diffusion of privatization policy? Several diffusion mechanisms, 
such as learning from other experiences and emulating policy trends exist. Policy learn-
ing implies that political actors are aware of the impact of certain policies (May 1992, p. 
333). Governments scan the available information and evidence on the failure and suc-
cess of certain policy strategies and follow those countries in which policy decisions 
produce the intended results (Lee and Strang 2006). A “foreign model may (…) offer a 
ready-made answer to ill-defined domestic pressure for ‘change’ and ‘innovation’” 
(Simmons and Elkins 2004, p. 174) and may provide information about the costs and 
the benefits of a certain policy strategy. In the case of emulation, governments may imi-
tate the dominant policy fashion within a group of similar and closely related countries 
(Elkins and Simmons 2005; Simmons and Elkins 2004). Linked together, through in-
tense communication networks, governments follow the policy mainstream in order to 
protect their reputation or to “avoid the stigma of backwardness” (Meseguer 2009, p. 
27; Simmons and Elkins 2004). The application of a certain policy by many others 
serves “as information that this might be the best thing to do” (Holzinger and Knill 
2005, p. 784).  
The probability of learning from each other or emulating the policy of related coun-
tries should, in principle, vary with the intensity of communication between two coun-
tries and therefore with the availability of information. Indeed, governments can only 
pay attention to the information at hand as the availability of information and the inten-
sity of communication depends on various factors. First of all, geographical proximity 
may increase the connectivity of countries (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Weyland 2006). 
Countries located in close geographical proximity are directly accessible to each other 
and typically demonstrate a large exchange of information. Policy change enacted next 
door has particular immediacy and therefore availability. Hence, neighbors are assumed 
to influence each other more strongly than countries located on different sides of the 
globe (Weyland 2006). 
                                                 
4  In this paper, diffusion is treated as a process and not as an outcome (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Holzinger and 
Knill 2005).  Furthermore, diffusion only refers to spatial interdependencies and not to other forms of spatial as-
sociation (Simmons and Elkins 2004). 
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Second, cultural propinquity in terms of a common language, religion or heritage, fa-
cilitates communication and enhances the possibilities for sharing information. It is 
likely that political actors mimic the policy trend within their “Family of Nations” (Cas-
tles 1993) or cultural reference group encompassing countries with the same cultural 
roots. Cultural proximity should, in principle, give salience to new models and policy-
makers will then tend to study them closely. The diffusion of privatization policy should 
therefore occur to a greater extent among countries with a similar cultural background 
(Simmons and Elkins 2004, p. 175; Lee and Strang 2006, p. 889; Lenschow et al. 2005).  
Third, intense communication can also be economically defined by private and busi-
ness actors who establish dense communication networks. “Business people may trans-
mit ideas about the appropriate economic policy by looking to the experiences of the 
countries with which they have especially intense trading contacts” (Simmons and El-
kins 2004, p. 175). A government will especially take the policies of trading partners 
into account “because of the close communication (learning through communication) 
and dependency (control through resource dependence) between those countries” (Jahn 
2006, p. 408). This leads to the following hypotheses. 
H1) Countries adopt the privatization policy of other countries located in their geo-
graphical proximity. 
H2)  Privatization policy diffuses amongst countries with a similar cultural back-
ground.  
H3)  Governments adopt the policy of their most important trading partners. 
Furthermore, governments may imitate those policy outputs that seem to lead to the 
intended outcomes. Regarding privatization policy, one central political objective and 
intended outcome has been to improve the financial and operating performance of pub-
lic enterprises. Political decision-makers have emphasized the importance of corporate 
governance techniques (i.e. formal privatization) as well as the divestment of shares (i.e. 
material privatization) as important tools for resolving agency problems and, as a con-
sequence, for increasing efficiency at the company level (Megginson and Netter 2001; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Governments may observe the economic performance of 
privatized firms in other countries. If privatization efforts lead to improvements in the 
performance indicators of the telecommunication provider in question, it would be  ex-
pected that the political decision makers  imitate these policy strategies (Meseguer 
2005).  
H4) Governments implement the privatization policies of those countries where 
privatization  has improved the performance of the national telecommunication 
provider.   
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However, it is likely that the effect of diffusion is conditioned by national characteris-
tics. Country attributes might mediate the relevance of diffusion in domestic policy 
choices, since not all countries are equally sensitive to diffusion mechanisms (Gilardi 
2010; Brooks 2007).  
First, I argue that the importance of the diffusion of privatization policy might be 
shaped by the party composition of the government. The ideology and the prior beliefs 
of political actors constrain the influence of new information (Gilardi 2010, p. 651). The 
imitation of privatization policy is more likely when the government is controlled by 
right-wing parties since market-oriented policies are more compatible to their party plat-
form. By contrast, left-wing parties should, in principle, be more sceptical of and reluc-
tant to facilitate the diffusion of liberalization and privatization policies (Martin 2010). 
Second, it is likely that governments in open economies will be more receptive to 
diffusion mechanisms. If the markets are highly open to external influences, political 
actors will adopt the international trends to a greater extent. This is of special relevance 
for the privatization of public enterprises. If governments in open economies were to 
disregard the global trend of privatization, the public enterprises might no longer be 
competitive and fail to survive in the international market. This might affect particularly 
open economies with a high dependence on international markets. In less open econo-
mies with a greater focus on the domestic market, the costs of dropping behind might be 
lower. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
H5) Leftist governments are assumed to be more reluctant to facilitate the diffusion 
of privatization policy.  
H6)  In open economies, diffusion processes are of greater relevance than in less 
open economies.  
4. DATA AND METHOD  
Measurement and Description of Public Entrepreneurship 
One of the central drawbacks of the existing empirical literature is the measurement of 
privatization. The proceeds obtained by privatization, which are typically used as an 
indicator, only permit the analysis of the divestment of shares and not the extension of 
public entrepreneurship. Furthermore, none of the existing indicators incorporates for-
mal privatization as a dimension of privatization that is especially relevant to network 
based utilities. Therefore, a new ‘index of public entrepreneurship’ has been developed 
which measures the extent of public entrepreneurship and brings together the concept of 
formal and material privatization.5 Based on this information, a completely new data-
                                                 
5  To generate this database, information from national governments, regulatory agencies, national laws, and public 
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base which provides internationally comparative data for all telecommunication provid-
ers has been generated.  
Formally, the ‘index of public entrepreneurship’ is calculated as follows:  
(1) 


jSCi
SC
i
SC
i
PC
i
DA
i sXXXI   
XDA  1=Departmental Agency; 0=Other Organizational Form 
XPC:  1=Public Corporation; 0= Other Organizational Form  
XiSC 1=State Company; 0= other Organizational Form  
α  Weighting for Formal Privatization, Type I 
β  Weighting for Formal Privatization, Type II 
siSC  Shares hold by the State  
The index which has a range from 0 to 1,  identifies the type of organizational form 
(Departmental Agency, Public Corporation, State Company) and the percentage of 
shares owned by the government (s) on an annual basis  The different organizational 
forms are weighted according to their autonomy from the political centre of authority. If 
a departmental agency (DA) provides the national telecommunication services, the in-
dex equals 1 which is the maximum value (in this case XDA equals 1 and XPC as well as 
XSC 0). When the state transforms the departmental agency into a public corporation 
(PC), then XPC is weighted with α (here XDA and XSC are 0). α has to be smaller than 1 
to indicate the retreat of the state and the enterprise’s greater autonomy from political 
actors. The weighting for a transformation into a joint stock company is β. Since the 
possibilities to influence the operational decisions of a joint stock company decrease for 
political actors in comparison to a public corporation (even though the state remains the 
unique shareholder), β has to be smaller than α. If the state additionally sells public 
shares (material privatization) the index value further decreases. When, for instance, 
49% of the public shares are divested, the weighting equals β x .51 as the state still 
holds 51% of the shares. Once a firm becomes completely privately owned (s=0), it 
drops out of the index.6  The sample includes 18 OECD countries7 and covers the period 
from 1980 to 2007.8 
                                                                                                                                               
enterprises was collected, compiled and analyzed. The index has also been developed for other sectors and for 
each national economy. 
6  If more than one publicly owned firm operates in the sector then the firms enter in the index relative to their 
output in terms of revenues.  
7  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The United States and 
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To illustrate the national privatization paths, figure 2 shows the development of pub-
lic entrepreneurship in 18 OECD countries for the period between 1980 and 2007. 
Figure 2: The Development of Public Entrepreneurship in 18 OECD Countries 
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Figure 2 reveals a remarkable degree of variance over time and across space. While in 
most countries, telecommunication services were provided by departmental agencies at 
the beginning of the observation period (e.g. Germany & Norway), other countries (e.g. 
Spain & the United Kingdom) started at a relatively lower level of public entrepreneur-
ship. Furthermore, countries such as France or the Netherlands restructured their tele-
communication enterprises gradually, while New Zealand, for example, has radically 
privatized its telecommunication provider. The national timing of privatization also dif-
fers greatly from country to country. Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom al-
ready initiated privatizations in the 1980s. In contrast, other countries such as Switzer-
                                                                                                                                               
Canada were excluded since the telecommunication sectors in these countries had been organized privately before 
the period of observation began. 
8  Since no theoretical justification for the selection of α and β exists, sensitivity analyses were applied using differ-
ent weightings. The results do not differ substantially by  using different weightings. Therefore formal and mate-
rial privatization is weighted equally in this paper with formal privatization being subdivided into two different 
types. This means that α equals .75 and β .5. 
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land and Finland did not jump onto the privatization bandwagon until the 1990s. Over-
all, a clear downward convergence trend is observable, even though the state has not 
completely withdrawn from telecommunication services in most countries. 
Method 
The basic assumption of this paper is that privatization policy diffuses across space. 
Spatial interdependencies can be modelled by including a spatial term as a regressor 
(spatial lag model) (Anselin 2003). The general spatio-temporal autoregressive model 
(STAR) can be expressed as follows where y is the private involvement in the telecom-
munication sector: 
(2)   XMyWyy  
The private involvement is measured by 1 minus the level of public entrepreneurship I 
(for the ‘Index of Public Entrepreneurship I’, see above).9 ρ is a spatial autoregressive 
coefficient and Wy is the weighted average of the dependent variable (spatial lag). The 
spatial weight matrix W (NTxNT) reflects the relative connectivity of each country i to 
every other country at time t. The effect on a focal country is then a weighted sum of 
outcomes across countries (Lee and Strang 2006).   is the temporal autoregressive 
coefficient and M is a NTxNT matrix to create the first order temporal lag (ones on the 
minor diagonal). X is a set of exogenous right hand side variables.  
Before analyzing the different diffusion mechanisms, it must be checked whether 
there is spatial association in the dependent variable. Moran’s I as well as Geary’s C 
indicate spatial correlation for all estimated models. Furthermore the local indicators for 
spatial association show that the spatial correlation is not caused by a single value.  
True spatial interdependence has to be carefully distinguished from other sources of 
spatial association in order to solve Galton’s problem. Spatial patterns in the dependent 
variable might also be caused by common shocks or trends or unobserved spatial het-
erogeneity. The only possibility to disentangle spatial dependence from its alternatives 
is to model it and include appropriate right hand side variables (Plümper and Neumayer 
2010, p. 215). A failure to account for such alternatives will bias the spatial lag coeffi-
cient. To control the  common shocks, I added period dummies. Furthermore, a lagged 
dependent variable captures common trends and temporal dynamics. A lagged depend-
ent variable has the disadvantage of accounting for the largest part of the variance in the 
dependent variable and of absorbing the explanatory power of the other substantial right 
hand variables. However, the focus in this paper is on guaranteeing  reliable results for 
the spatial lags and not on  identifying the substantive influence for the control vari-
                                                 
9  To avoid confusions about the sign, the private involvement is taken and not the level of public entrepreneurship.  
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ables. Therefore, the procedure can be seen as a conservative test strategy for the hy-
potheses on spatial interdependencies since “a statistically significant effect (...) under 
such a condition, (…) is a valuable evidence of a causal effect” (Kittel 1999, p. 230). To 
cope with unobserved spatial heterogeneity unit, fixed effect models are estimated. Ad-
ditionally, using OLS for a spatial diagnostic tests on the residuals of the non spatial 
model  , gives further information about the nature of the spatial association. The Ro-
bust Lagrange Multiplier Test against the spatial lag or spatial error alternative might 
indicate whether the spatial association is caused by unobserved factors. Therefore the 
results of  the tests are displayed in the regression tables (Franzese and Hays 2007, 
2008; Anselin et al. 1996).  
In the empirical analysis, I analyze instantaneous spatial interdependencies and time-
lagged spatial interdependence. The reason is that  we do not know if privatization poli-
cies in different countries influence each other simultaneously or with a time lag. The 
estimation of instantaneous spatial interdependencies causes several methodological 
problems. The spatial lag on the right hand side of the equation is a weighted average of 
the left hand side variable. Therefore the spatial lags are endogenous and covary with 
the residuals, while spatial OLS estimations would be inconsistent and affected by si-
multaneity bias. To deal with this problem, I estimate spatial maximum likelihood mod-
els. Spatial maximum likelihood estimation provides consistent and efficient parameter 
estimates in the case of instantaneous interdependencies (Franzese and Hays 2007 2008; 
Hays 2009). The models with a temporally-lagged spatial lag are not affected by simul-
taneity bias (in the absence of temporally autocorrelated residuals) and can therefore be 
estimated by spatial OLS regressions. In the spatial OLS models, I dealt with heterosce-
dasticity by estimating the models with robust standard errors.  
Weight Matrices and Control Variables: Measurement  
When estimating spatial lag models, the weighting matrix must be carefully specified. 
In order to test the hypotheses, I use several different weighting matrices. The baseline 
model weights the privatization policy of all other countries equally. To test the hy-
pothesis of whether the geographical proximity determines spatial interdependencies, 
the privatization policy is weighted by the inverse distance between the capitals (H1). 
The spatial lag expressing linguistic proximity is a binary variable which is expressed 
by the number one (variable one?!) if two countries share a common language (H2). 
Weighting the change of public entrepreneurship with the sum of exports and imports 
between two countries as a percentage of the total trade volume, allows a check on 
whether trading partners adopt similar policies (H3). Hypothesis 4 assumes that gov-
ernments implement privatization policies which are associated with the intended mi-
croeconomic improvements. To test H4, I use the annual change in the turnover of the 
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national telecommunication provider for the weight matrix. Since the growth of turn-
over might be negative, the values are rescaled on a range from 0 to 1. All weighting 
matrices are row standardized so that each row adds up to a total of one.  
Furthermore, I include a comprehensive set of political and economic control vari-
ables discussed in the research literature to determine the extent and timing of privatiza-
tion policy. Leftist governments are assumed to engage less in privatization policy. The 
higher the percentage of cabinet seats controlled by leftist parties, the lower the retreat 
of the state from telecommunication services should be (Boix 1997). The openness of 
the economy as an indicator for global integration is measured by the sum of imports 
and exports in relation to GDP. According to the efficiency hypothesis, a highly open 
economy should be associated with a reduction of public involvement in economic af-
fairs (Garrett and Mitchell 2001). Since privatization is often seen as an instrument for 
restoring public budgets, I assume that an increase in the deficit as a percentage of the 
GDP is associated with greater privatization efforts (Bortolotti et al. 2003). The level 
and the growth of GDP indicate the economic situation of the country. A high level of 
GDP growth should go hand in hand with moderate privatization policy due to the rela-
tively low economic pressure that this entails (Bortolotti et al. 2003). Privatization is 
assumed to be promoted by European integration, which is taken account of with a 
dummy for EU membership (Schneider and Häge 2008). Moreover, the institutional 
setting may impose constraints on the possibilities for implementing privatization poli-
cies (Immergut 1992). Theoretically, a high number of veto points should be associated 
with low levels of privatization.10 The details of the measurements of all variables are 
presented in Table A1.  
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Table 1 presents the findings for the maximum likelihood estimations that test instanta-
neous spatial interdependencies. All the right hand side variables with the exception of 
the spatial lag are serially lagged by one year to address potential problems of endoge-
neity. Models 1 to 5 test the different spatial lags using different theoretically informed 
weight matrices. Model 1 is the baseline model and includes a spatial lag weighting the 
privatization policies of all other countries equally. The coefficient of the spatial lag in 
the baseline model 1 is not significant. In contrast, the hypothesis that governments 
adopt the policies of countries which are located in close proximity to them is supported 
by the empirical evidence. The spatial lag in model 2 using the geographical distance as 
                                                 
10  Competition is often mentioned in this context. However, competition is not a cause of privatization. It is rather a 
consequence of or the result of the same underlying process. 
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Table 1: Spatial Interdependencies in Privatization Policy (Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mation) 
Dependent variable: Private Involvement in the Telecommunication Sectora 
Independent variables (1) 
EQUAL 
(2) 
DISTANCE 
(3) 
LANGUAGE 
(4) 
TRADE 
(5) 
TURN-
OVER 
Private Involvementt-1  
.848*** 
(.024) 
.842*** 
(.024) 
.845*** 
(.024) 
.845*** 
(.024) 
.848*** 
(.024) 
Openness .0002 (.0005) 
.0001 
(.0005) 
1.01e-06 
(.0005) 
.0002 
(.0005) 
.0002 
(.0005) 
GDP per capita  1.52E-06 (1.60E-06) 
1.19E-06 
(1.53E-06) 
2.20E-06 
(1.43E-06) 
1.48E-06 
(1.48E-06) 
1.50E-06 
1.59E-06 
GDP growth -.004* (.002) 
-.004 
(.002) 
-.004 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.004 
(.002) 
Deficit -.002 (.001) 
-0.002 
0.001 
-0.002 
0.001 
-0.002 
0.001 
-0.002 
0.001 
Institution .016 (.013) 
.015 
(.013) 
.021* 
(.013) 
.012 
(.013) 
.016 
(.013) 
EU Membership .032 (.022) 
.032 
(.022) 
.029 
(.022) 
.030 
(.022) 
.032 
(.022) 
Leftist Government -1.74e-05 (9.75e-05) 
-3.34e-05 
(9.76e-05) 
-2.43e-05 
(9.79e-05) 
-.3.75e-05 
(9.77e-05) 
1.81e-05 
(9.75e-05) 
Spatial Lag (average) .085 (.070)     
Spatial Lag (distance)  .124** (.059)    
Spatial Lag (language)   
.029 
(.024)   
Spatial Lag (trade)    
.116** 
(.052)  
Spatial Lag (turnover)     
.087 
(.068) 
RLM (Spatial Lag) 2.971* 7.483*** 1.981 5.530** 3.389* 
RLM (Spatial Error) 1.314 2.567 .478 .802 1.566 
Wald Chi 7157.24*** 4163.46*** 6098.64*** 4348.59*** 4476.09*** 
N 468 468 468 468 468 
Note: The fixed effects are suppressed to conserve space;  standard errors in parentheses; *** z, p<0.01, ** z, 
p<0.05, * z, p<0.1; a: The private involvement is measured by 1 minus the Index of Public Entrepreneurship I (see 
pp. 11f); RLM = Robust Lagrange Multiplier Test on the residuals of the nonspatial OLS models against the spatial 
lag or spatial error alternative  
 
the weighting, clearly improves the model fit in comparison to the baseline model. The 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 5%-level and the sub-stantive effect (.124) is 
stronger than in the baseline model. If countries retreat from telecommunication ser-
vices, countries in close geographical proximity move in the same direction. Further-
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more, governments tend to follow the policy trend which is dominant among important 
trading partners and they implement privatization strategies when economically related 
countries reduce their public involvement in the telecommunications sector. The coeffi-
cient has a substantive size of .116. and is also significant at the 5%-level. Rather strik-
ingly, there is little evidence that a common language leads to countries mimicking cul-
turally similar countries.  
The hypothesis that countries adopt the policies from other countries with similar 
cultural background is not sustained empirically. The coefficient is substantively low 
and far from being significant. The results for the spatial lag weighted by the develop-
ment of turnover in model 5, are similar to those for the spatial lag in the baseline 
model. This finding does not support the hypothesis that governments implement the 
policies chosen by countries with relatively well-performing telecommunication provid-
ers. In sum, the relevant spatial interdependencies appear to be determined by the geo-
graphical and economic attributes of the countries concerned, rather than by cultural 
attributes, such as a common language or the economic performance of the public en-
terprises in question. The control variables remain mainly insignificant primarily due to 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. However, the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable is necessary to control the common trends.  
Table 2 presents the results based on the assumption that privatization policies influ-
ence each other with a one year time lag.11 Models 1 to 3 analyze the relevance of the 
spatial lag weighting the policies equally, by trade and distance. The results for time-
lagged spatial interdependencies in models 1 to 3 support the findings of table 1. The 
coefficient of the spatial lag in model 1 is insignificant. Model 2, which uses the dis-
tance-weighted spatial lag, clearly demonstrates that the geographical proximity is 
highly relevant for the diffusion of privatization policy. The spatial lag weighted by 
economic interdependence performs better than the baseline model in terms of effi-
ciency. In contrast, the models using common language or the turnover growth, once 
again indicate that the spatial interdependencies are not defined by a common cultural 
background or the operational development of the companies (not reported). 
Model 4 and 5 test the hypotheses of whether the impact of diffusion is conditioned 
by the domestic party ideology or the openness of the economy.12 While estimating in-
teraction effects, coefficients and effects have to be carefully distinguished (Franzese 
                                                 
11  A decreasing coefficient for the estimations including two-year and three-year lagged spatial lags (not reported) 
indicates that policies diffuse in close temporal proximity (i.e. over relatively short spaces of time). 
12  To conserve space, the results for the interaction effects are only presented for the spatial lag weighted by the 
distance. The findings for the spatial lag and the interaction effect using the trade-weighted spatial lag remain the 
same.  
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Table 2: Spatial Interdependencies in Privatization Policy (Spatial OLS) 
Dependent variable: Private Involvement in the Telecommunication Sectora 
Independent variables (1) 
EQUAL 
(2) 
DISTANCE 
(3) 
TRADE 
(4) 
INTER-
ACTION 
(5) 
INTER-
ACTION 
Private Involvementt-1 
.837*** 
(.043) 
.826*** 
(.045) 
.832*** 
(.044) 
.810*** 
(.047) 
.821*** 
(.047) 
Openness .0002 (.0006) 
6.70e-05 
(.0006) 
8.41e-05 
(.0006) 
-.001b 
(.001) 
-2.55e-05 
(.0006) 
GDP per capita  8.26E-07 (1.58E-06) 
5.69E-07 
(1.39E-06) 
1.62E-06 
(1.21E-06) 
-8.78E-07 
(1.52E-06) 
4.34E-08 
(1.36E-06) 
GDP growth -.004 (.002) 
-.003* 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
Deficit -.002 (.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.003* 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
Institution .013 (.016) 
.013 
(.015) 
.011 
(.016) 
.009 
(.016) 
.013 
(.015) 
EU Membership .041 (.028) 
.043 
(.029) 
.040 
(.029) 
.053 
(.029) 
.462 
(.029) 
Leftist Government 6.14E-06 (.0001) 
-7.36e-06 
(.0001) 
-1.40e-05 
(.0001) 
-6.0e-05 
(.0001) 
-9.41e-06b 
(.0001) 
Spatial Lagt-1 (average) 
.168 
(.128)     
Spatial Lagt-1 (dis-
tance)  
.214** 
(.102)  
.291***b 
(.114) 
.233**b 
(.106) 
Spatial Lagt-1 (trade)   
.148* 
(.083)   
Spatial Lagt-1 (dis-
tance) x Openness    
.002*** 
(.001)  
Spatial Lagt-1 (dis-
tance) x Left     
-.0005 
(.0004) 
F 774.96*** 762.72*** 767.73*** 855.24*** 787.94*** 
N 450 450 450 450 450 
Note: The country and period fixed effects are suppressed to conserve space;  standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a: The private involvement is measured by 1 minus the Index of Public Entrepreneur-
ship I (see pp. 11f) b: the standard error and significance level refer to the situation when the other part of the inter-
action effect equals its mean 
 
and Kam 2010). The effects of the spatial lag depend on the level of the other variables 
with which the spatial lag interacts. Since the variables have been centred before build-
ing the interaction term via crossproducts, the coefficient of the spatial lag only tells us 
something about the situation when the other part of the interaction effect equals the 
mean. Therefore, the development of the spatio-autoregressive coefficient (and the stan-
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dard error) according to the openness of the economy and the party ideology, is sepa-
rately presented in table 3.13  
The results for the interaction effects, strongly support the assumption that national 
characteristics influence the impact of diffusion mechanisms. Open economies are 
highly spatially interdependent. The  governments are more receptive to international 
trends in open economies than in less open economies. The coefficient of the spatial lag 
when the openness of the economy equals the minimum is .211, .291 at its mean and 
.473 at its maximum. The effect of the diffusion variable (Spatial lag distance) is dupli-
cated by turning (switching) from an economy which  is internationally isolated to an 
economy which  is highly involved in international trade flows. The party ideology also 
matters, but to a lesser extent. If the cabinet does not include a leftist party, the coeffi-
cient equals .255 and is significant at the 5%-level. In contrast, in a 100% leftist cabinet, 
the coefficient of the spatial lag is .200 and turns out to be less significant. Table 3 
summarizes the development of the coefficient and the respective standard error of the 
spatial lag in accordance with the conditioning factors.  
Table 3: Coefficient of the Spatial Lag according to the Openness of the Economy or 
the Party Ideology 
Openness Party Ideology 
Value of  
Openness 
Coefficient of  
Spatial Lag 
Value of  
Party Ideology 
Coefficient of  
Spatial Lag 
20 .211** (.102) 0 
.255** 
(.110) 
50 .259** (.109) 20 
.244** 
(.108) 
80 .307*** (118) 40 
.233** 
(.106) 
110 .354*** (.128) 60 
.222** 
(.105) 
140 .402*** (.139) 80 
.211** 
(.104) 
170 .449*** (.151) 100 
.200* 
(.105) 
185 .473*** (.158)   
Note: Standard error in parentheses, *** p<.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
13  The marginal effect δy/δx is calculated by βX + βXZ * z. Therefore the same sign of βX and βXZ strengthen the 
effect of x and vice versa. 
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Overall, four empirical findings stand out. First, the results clearly show that spatial 
interdependencies matter regarding privatization policy despite controls has been made 
for alternative sources of spatial patterns, such as common trends or spatial clustering in 
the explanatory variables. Governments do not implement privatization policies inde-
pendently of each other. Second, the relevant spatial interdependencies are determined 
by geographical proximity and economic relationships. Countries clearly tend to privat-
ize when trading partners or countries that are geographically close to them do so. 
Third, there is no evidence that governments adopt policies of countries with similar 
cultural backgrounds or simply where privatization leads to the intended outcomes at 
the company level. Fourth, the diffusion of privatization policy is highly influenced by 
the openness of the economy. Open economies are more receptive to diffusion mecha-
nisms than economies that are only moderately involved in the international market.   
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated whether privatization policies in the telecommunication 
sector have diffused throughout the OECD-world and, if so, what the main diffusion 
mechanisms are. To address this question, a new database which captures public entre-
preneurship in the telecommunications sector of 18 OECD countries for the period 1980 
to 2007 was compiled. The need for a new indicator stems from the fact that compara-
tive quantitative empirical studies so far have by and large only taken into account the 
material dimension of privatization. This index makes it possible for the first time to 
comprehensively depict privatization by integrating formal privatization (a change in 
legal status to more market-oriented organizational forms) and material privatization 
(the divestment of public enterprises).  
The descriptive results presented in the paper clearly show a downward trend in pub-
lic entrepreneurship, although in general the state has not completely backed out of the 
telecommunication sector. All analyzed countries have formally privatized their tele-
communication providers. However, in most of the countries, the state still holds public 
shares in these companies. Besides the mentioned common trends, countries differ 
greatly in terms of the timing, initial size and dynamics of the reform process.  
The basic assumption of this contribution was that privatization policies are spatially 
interdependent. The wave of privatization swept across these countries in a specific way 
and through specific channels of diffusion. Several hypotheses regarding possible diffu-
sion mechanisms were derived and tested by applying spatial econometric techniques. 
The empirical findings of the quantitative analysis support the assumption that while 
analysis of privatization, spatial interdependencies have to be considered. It has been 
shown that governments adopt the policy strategy of those countries which are impor-
tant trading partners or are located in close geographical proximity. It is therefore the 
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policy trend amongst geographically and economically related countries that drive  the 
diffusion of privatization policy forward. One striking result is that countries seem not 
to adopt the policy strategies of countries with a similar cultural background. Further-
more, policy diffusion is not influenced by the microeconomic performance of the na-
tional telecommunication provider. Whether policies have the desired consequences and 
lead to the intended outcomes at the company level does not appear to influence the 
decision of decreasing public involvement in the sector.  
There are several avenues for future research. Extending the analysis to other sectors 
in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the sector-specific diffusion mecha-
nisms would be one more far-reaching step. Furthermore, the significance of the politi-
cal consequences (such as changed voting behavior) that a reform may have on the dif-
fusion of policies, is highly under-investigated. For example, do political actors adopt 
those policies which promise to ensure their re-election or those which promise to actu-
ally lead to the desired policy outcomes? The analysis of different diffusion mecha-
nisms or factors that trigger or condition diffusion processes, even with regard to priva-
tization and liberalisation policies,  is still in its infancy,  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Measurement and Sources of the Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Private Involvement  1- Index of Public Entrepreneurship  Own data source 
Leftist Government Cabinet seats of leftist parties as a percentage of total 
cabinet posts (weighted by days) 
Armingeon et al. 
(2008) 
Openness  Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP Heston et al. 
(2009) 
Deficit Annual deficit (government primary balance) as a per-
centage of GDP 
Armingeon et al. 
(2008) 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita UN (2009) 
GDP growth Growth of real GDP OECD (2008) 
EU Membership EU membership on an annual basis (1=yes; 0=no) Own assessment 
Institution Additive  index of constitutional structures composed of 
five indicators: (1) federalism (0=absence, 1=weak, 
2=strong) (2) parliamentary government =0, versus presi-
dentialism or other =1 (3) proportional representation =0, 
modified proportional representation=1, majoritarian=2 
(4) bicameralism (1=weak, 2=strong), (5) frequent refer-
enda=1. 
Armingeon et al. 
(2008)  
Weighting Matrix - 
Turnover 
Annual point changes in the turnover of the national tele-
communication provider 
Own data source 
Weighting matrix - 
Distance 
Inverse distance between the capitals in km http://www.theglo
betrotter.de/welt 
reise/weltreise/ 
planung/entfernun
gen.html 
Weighting Matrix - 
Trade 
Sum of exports and imports between two countries as a 
percentage of the total trade volume 
IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics 
Weighting Matrix - 
Language 
Binary variable (1=sharing a common language; 0=not 
sharing a common language) 
Own assessment 
 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 143) 
- 22 - 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
Carina Schmitt is research fellow at the Collaborative Research Center “Transforma-
tions of the State”, University of Bremen.  
Telephone:  +49 421 218 7860 
Fax:  +49 421 218-8721 
E-Mail: carina.schmitt@sfb597.uni-bremen.de 
Address: University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center „Transfor-
mations of the State“, Linzer Strasse 9a, D 28359 Bremen 
 
